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Showing newest 17 of 25 posts from 6/1/09 - 7/1/09. Show older posts
Showing newest 17 of 25 posts from 6/1/09 - 7/1/09. Show older posts

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Denial of Service attacks : Summary

Summary
  • Denial of Service is a very commonly used attack methodology.

  • Distributed Denial Of Service using a multiplicity of Zombie machines is an often seen attack methodology.

  • There are various tools available for attackers to perpetrate DOS attacks.

  • Protection against DOS is difficult due to the very nature of the attacks.

  • Different scanning tools are available to aid detection and plugging of vulnerabilities leading to DOS

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
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Common IDS systems

  1. Shareware

  2. Snort

  3. Shadow

  4. Courtney

  5. Commercial

  6. ISS RealSecure

  7. Axent NetProwler

  8. Cisco Secure ID (Net Ranger)

  9. Network Flight Recorder

  10. Network Security Wizard's Dragon

An Intrusion Detection System (abbreviated as IDS) is a defense system, which detects hostile activities in a network. The key is then to detect and possibly prevent activities that may compromise system security, or a hacking attempt in progress including reconnaissance/data collection phases that involve for example, port scans.

One key feature of intrusion detection systems is their ability to provide a view of unusual activity and issue alerts notifying administrators and/or block a suspected connection. In addition, IDS tools are capable of distinguishing between insider attacks originating from inside the organization (coming from own employees or customers) and external ones (attacks and the thread posed by hackers).

Once an intrusion has been detected, IDS issues alerts notifying administrators of this fact. The next step is undertaken either by the administrators or the IDS itself, by taking advantage of additional countermeasures (specific block functions to terminate sessions, backup systems, routing connections to a system trap, legal infrastructure etc.) - following the organization's security policy.

There are two kinds of DDOS-generated traffic, control traffic (between DDOS client and servers) and flood traffic (between DDOS servers and DDOS victim).

Anomaly 0: This is not real "DDOS" traffic, but it can be a viable method of determining the origin of DDOS attacks. As observed by RFP, an attacker will have to resolve his victim's hostname before a DDOS attack. BIND name servers are capable of recording these requests. You can either send them a WINCH signal with 'kill' or you can specify query logging in the BIND configuration. A single PTR type query before an attack indicates the request was made from the attacker's host, a great load of PTR type query for a DDOS victim before an attack indicates that the flood servers have been fed a host name and each server was resolving the hostname for itself.

Anomaly 1: Amount of bandwidth exceeds a maximum threshold that is expected normal traffic for a site could cause. Alternatively, the threshold can be measures for addresses in the traffic. These are clear signs of flood traffic and ACL rules can be implemented on the backbone routers that detect these signs and filter traffic.

Anomaly 2: Oversized ICMP and UDP packets. Stateful UDP sessions are normally using small UDP packets, having a payload of not more than 10 bytes. Normal ICMP messages don't exceed 64 to 128 bytes. Packets that are reasonably bigger are suspicious of containing control traffic, mostly the encrypted target(s) and other options for the DDOS server. Once (non-decoy) control traffic is spotted, one of the DDOS servers' location is revealed, as the destination IP address is not spoofed in control traffic.

Anomaly 3: TCP packets (and UDP packets) that are not part of a connection. The stealthiest DDOS tools use random protocols, including connection-oriented protocols, to send data over non-connection-oriented channels. Using stateful firewalls or link-state routing can discover these packets. Additionally, packets that indicate connection requests with destination ports above 1024, with which no known service is registered and running, are highly suspicious.

Anomaly 4: Packet payload contains ONLY alphanumeric character (e.g. no spaces, punctuation, control characters). This can be a sign that the packet payload is BASE64-encoded, and therefore contains only base64 characters. TFN2K is sending such packets in its control traffic. A TFN2K (and TFN2K derivatives) specific pattern is a string of repeating A's (AAAA...) in the payload, since the buffer size is padded by the encryption routine. If the BASE64 encoding is not used, and the payload contains binary encrypted traffic, the A's will be trailing binary \0's.

Anomaly 5: Packet payload contains ONLY binary, high-bit characters. While this can be a binary file transfer (traffic transmitted over ports 20, 21, 80, etc. must be excluded if this rule is applied), especially if contained in packets that are not part of valid stateful traffic, it is suspicious of being non-base64 encoded, but encrypted control traffic that is being transmitted in the packet payload.

Some of the popular IDS are:

  1. Shareware

  2. Snort

  3. Shadow

  4. Courtney

  5. Commercial

  6. ISS RealSecure

  7. Axent NetProwler

  8. Cisco Secure ID (Net Ranger)

  9. Network Flight Recorder

  10. Network Security Wizard's Dragon

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
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Friday, June 26, 2009

BackTrack 4 Pre-release available now !!

I previously blogged about Backtrack 3,the ultimate hacking tool disc with over 300 tools…Now..the good news follows up as the latest version of Backtrack was unveiled by the guys at Remote Exploit.

For those that don’t know what BackTrack is,It is the top rated linux live distribution focused on penetration testing. With no installation whatsoever, the analysis platform is started directly from the CD-Rom and is fully accessible within minutes. BackTrack 4

It’s evolved from the merge of the two wide spread distributions – Whax and Auditor Security Collection. By joining forces and replacing these distributions, BackTrack has gained massive popularity and was voted in 2006 as the #1 Security Live Distribution by insecure.org. Security professionals as well as new-comers are using BackTrack as their favorite toolset all over the globe.

The new version has busted the 700mb file size though so it’d DVD or USB, it’s recommended to use a USB drive to run it or install it on your HDD as running from a CD isn’t exactly speedy.

Download BackTrack 4 Prerelaease

 

POSTED BY XERO . ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.Source-Darknet

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Wednesday, June 24, 2009

Doom Creators Bought by Fallout makers

Imagine Doom, Fallout, Oblivion, Wolfenstein, Carmack, Howard... all in one company. The dream became reality in one  ID bought by ZenMaxbig shock.
Gaming industry witnesses a new era of greatness as two of the most acclaimed game development studios of all time are joining forces. ZeniMax Media,the parent company of Fallout 3 and the highly acclaimed Elder Scrolls development studio Bethesda Softworks, announced today that it is purchasing legendary Doom and Wolfenstein studio id soft. 
id co-founder John Carmack, id CEO Todd Hollenshead and ZeniMax CEO Robert Altman commented that the purchase will change none of the principles of id and Bethesda but will allow id to grow like it never has before. The purchase does not affect plans for previously announced games from id that are slated for release through other publishers, including the Activision-backed Wolfenstein and the EA Partners-planned Rage.
As for the million dollar question - Why did id sell?ZeniMax Buys ID and merges Bethesda
Carmac justified by saying "We're really getting kind of tired competing with our own publishers in terms of how our titles will be featured,And we've really gotten more IPs than we've been able to take advantage of. And working with other companies hasn't been working out as spectacularly as it could. So the idea of actually becoming a publisher and merging Bethesda and ZeniMax on there [is ideal.] It would be hard to imagine a more complementary relationship. They are triple A, top-of-the-line in what they do in the RPGs. And they have no overlap with all the things we do in the FPSes."
Hollenshead pointed that ZeniMax's acquisition will allow id to grow its internal teams, staffing up the groups working on the next Doom — which will now be a ZeniMax game — and for starters,the Quake Live team.
The goal, explained Carmack, is for id to handle all of its own IPs. "We can build the pipeline and have a regular pipeline of releases."
In short -
ID + Bethesda = Pure Awsummness!!!!
Amen :)
Wolf Goes wild Fallout Merges Oblivion Continues As doom begins
Posted by XERO.ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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Use Windows Key for Start Menu in Linux

Yesterday I installed Vmware and tested Ubuntu Linux on it,however being a keyboard ninja,I felt clunked whenever I hitTried and tested on Ubuntu :) the Windows key (another windows habit of bringing Start Menu) to bring the Ubuntu Panel at the top of screen as nothing happened at that time. Ubuntu Panel is a dropdown menu which is used to launch applications, which is quite similar to the way Windows has the start menu. However If you are a windows user new to Ubuntu, you might want to have the windows key launch the applications menu. Thankfully this is an easy thing to do in Ubuntu.

Go to the System \ Preferences \ Keyboard Shortcuts menu item:

Modify the Key behaviour

 

Scroll down till you see the “Show the panel menu” item,click in the Shortcut column, and when it changes to “New accelerator…”, hit the Windows Key. Close all windows and you’re done!

Now whenever you will hit the windows key (intentionally/unintentionally/for God’s sake :P) , the application menu will pop up and you can navigate into it using the arrow keys.

 

Cheers and Keep Learning

 

POSTED BY XERO.ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.SOURCE

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A “Multivendor Post” to help our mutual iSCSI customers using VMware

SOURCE: Click Here

Posted by: Dan Israel

Today’s post is one you don’t often find in the blogosphere, see today’s post is a collaborative effort initiated by me, Chad Sakac (EMC), which includes contributions from Andy Banta (VMware), Vaughn Stewart (NetApp), Eric Schott (Dell/EqualLogic), and Adam Carter (HP/Lefthand), David Black (EMC) and various other folks at each of the companies.

Together, our companies make up the large majority of the iSCSI market, all make great iSCSI targets, and we (as individuals and companies) all want our customers to have iSCSI success.

I have to say, I see this one often - customer struggling to get high throughput out of iSCSI targets on ESX. Sometimes they are OK with that, but often I hear this comment: "…My internal SAS controller can drive 4-5x the throughput of an iSCSI LUN…"

Can you get high throughput with iSCSI with GbE on ESX? The answer is YES. But there are some complications, and some configuration steps that are not immediately apparent. You need to understanding some iSCSI fundamentals, some Link Aggregation fundamentals, and know some ESX internals – none of which are immediately obvious…

If you’re interested (and who wouldn’t be interested with a great topic and a bizzaro-world “multi-vendor collaboration”... I can feel the space-time continuum collapsing around me :-), read on...

We could start this conversation by playing a trump card; 10GbE, but we’ll save this topic for another discussion. Today 10GbE is relatively expensive per port and relatively rare, and the vast majority of iSCSI and NFS deployments are on GbE. 10GbE is supported by VMware today (see the VMware HCL here), and all of the vendors here either have, or have announced 10GbE support.

10GbE can support the ideal number of cables from an ESX host – two. This reduction in port count can simplify configurations, reduce the need for link aggregation, provide ample bandwidth, and even unify FC using FCoE on the same fabric for customers with existing FC investments. We all expect to see rapid adoption of 10GbE as prices continue to drop. Chad has blogged on 10GbE and VMware here.

This post is about trying to help people maximize iSCSI on GbE, so we’ll leave 10GbE for a followup.

If you are serious about iSCSI in your production environment, it’s valuable to do a bit of learning, and it’s important to do a little engineering during design. iSCSI is easy to connect and begin using, but like many technologies which excel in terms of their simplicity the default options and parameters may not be robust enough to provide an iSCSI infrastructure which can support your business.

With that in mind, this post is going to start with sections called “Understanding” which will walk through protocol details and ESX Software Initiator internals. You can skip them if you want to jump to configuration options, but a bit of learning goes a long way into understanding the WHY of the HOWs (which I personally always think makes them easier to remember).

Understanding your Ethernet Infrastructure

Do you have a “bet the business” Ethernet infrastructure? Don’t think of iSCSI (or NFS datastores) use here as “it’s just on my LAN”, but “this is the storage infrastructure that is supporting my entire critical VMware infrastructure”. IP storage needs the same sort of design thinking applied to FC infrastructure. Here are some things to think about:

Are you separating you storage and network traffic on different ports? Could you use VLANs for this? Sure. But is that “bet the business” thinking? Do you want a temporarily busy LAN to swamp your storage (and vice-versa) for the sake of a few NICs and switch ports? If you’re using 10GbE, sure – but GbE?
Think about Flow-Control (should be set to receive on switches and transmit on iSCSI targets)
Enable spanning tree protocol with either RSTP or portfast enabled
Filter / restrict bridge protocol data units on storage network ports
If you want to squeeze out the last bit, configure jumbo frames (always end-to-end – otherwise you will get fragmented gobbledygook)
Use Cat6 cables rather than Cat5/5e. Yes, Cat5e can work – but remember – this is “bet the business”, right? Are you sure you don’t want to buy that $10 cable?
You’ll see later that things like cross-stack Etherchannel trunking can be handy in some configurations.
Each Ethernet switch also varies in its internal architecture – for mission-critical, network intensive Ethernet purposes (like VMware datastores on iSCSI or NFS), amount of port buffers, and other internals matter – it’s a good idea to know what you are using.
If performance is important, have you thought about how many workloads (guests) are you running? Both individually and in aggregate are they typically random, or streaming? Random I/O workloads put very little throughput stress on the SAN network. Conversely, sequential, large block I/O workloads place a heavier load.

In the same vein, be careful running single stream I/O tests if your environment is multi-stream / multi-server. These types of tests are so abstract they provide zero data relative to the shared infrastructure that you are building.

In general, don’t view “a single big LUN” as a good test – all arrays have internal threads handling I/Os, and so does the ESX host itself (for VMFS and for NFS datastores). In general, in aggregate, more threads are better than fewer. You increase threading on the host with more operations against that single LUN (or file system), and every vendor’s internals are slightly different, but in general, more internal array objects are better than fewer – as there are more threads.

Not an “Ethernet” thing, but while we’re talking on the subject of performance generally and not skimping, there’s no magic on the brown spinny things – you need enough array spindles to support the IO workload – often not enough drives in total, or an under-configured specific sub/group of drives – every vendor does this differently (aggregates/RAID groups/pools), but all have some sort of “disk grouping” out of which LUNs (and file systems in some cases) get their collective IOPs.

Understanding: iSCSI Fundamentals

We need to begin with a prerequisite nomenclature to establish a start point. If you really want the “secret decoder ring” then start here: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3720

This diagram is chicken scratch, but it gets the point across. The red numbers are explained below.


iSCSI initiator = an iSCSI client, and serves the same purpose as an HBA, sending SCSI commands, and encapsulating in IP packets. This can operate in the hypervisor (example in this case this would be the ESX software initiator or hardware initiator) and/or in the guests (example – the Microsoft iSCSI initiator).
iSCSI target = an iSCSI server, usually on an array of some type. Arrays vary in how they implement this. Some have one (the array itself), some have many, some map them to physical interfaces, some make each LUN an iSCSI target.
iSCSI initiator port = the end-point of an iSCSI session, and is not a TCP port. After all the handshaking, the iSCSI initiator device creates and maintains a list of iSCSI initiator ports. Think of the iSCSI initiator port as the “on ramp” for data.
iSCSI network portal = an IP address or grouping of IP addresses used by iSCSI initiator or target (in which case it’s IP address and TCP port). There can be groupings of network portals into.. portal groups (see Multiple Connections per Session)
iSCSI Connection = a TCP Connection, and carries control info, SCSI commands and data being read or written.
iSCSI Session = one or more TCP connections that form an initiator-target session
Multiple Connections per Session (MC/S) = iSCSI can have multiple connections within a single session (see above).
MPIO = Multipathing, and used very generally as a term – but exists ABOVE the whole iSCSI layer (which in turn is on top of the network layer) in the hypervisor and/or in the guests. As an example, when you configure the ESX storage multipathing, that’s MPIO. MPIO is defacto load-balancing and availability model for iSCSI
Understanding: Link Aggregation Fundamentals

The next thing as a core bit of technology to understand is Link Aggregation. The group spent a fair amount of time going around on this as we were writing this post. Many people jump to this as a way as and “obvious” mechanism to provide greater aggregate bandwidth than a single GbE link can provide.

The core thing to understand (and the bulk of our conversation – thank you Eric and David) is that 802.3ad/LACP surely aggregates physical links, but the mechanisms used to determine the whether a given flow of information follows one link or another are critical.

Personally, I found this doc very clarifying.: http://www.ieee802.org/3/hssg/public/apr07/frazier_01_0407.pdf

You’ll note several key things in this doc:

All frames associated with a given “conversation” are transmitted on the same link to prevent mis-ordering of frames. So what is a “conversation”? A “conversation” is the TCP connection.
The link selection for a conversation is usually done by doing a hash on the MAC addresses or IP address.
There is a mechanism to “move a conversation” from one link to another (for loadbalancing), but the conversation stops on the first link before moving to the second.
Link Aggregation achieves high utilization across multiple links when carrying multiple conversations, and is less efficient with a small number of conversations (and has no improved bandwith with just one). While Link Aggregation is good, it’s not as efficient as a single faster link.
It’s notable that Link Aggregation and MPIO are very different. Link Aggregation applies between two network devices only. Link aggregation can load balance efficiently – but is not particularly efficient or predictable when there are a low number of TCP connections.

Conversely MPIO applies on an end-to-end iSCSI session – a full path from the initiator to the target. It can be efficient in loadbalancing with a low number of TCP sessions. While Link Aggregation can be applied to iSCSI (as will be discussed below), MPIO is generally the design point for iSCSI multipathing.


Understanding: iSCSI implementation in ESX 3.x

The key to understanding the issue is that the ESX 3.x software initiator only supports a single iSCSI session with a single TCP connection for each iSCSI target.


Making this visual… in the diagram above, while in iSCSI generally you can have multiple “purple pipes” each with one or more “orange pipes” to any iSCSI target, and use MPIO with multiple active paths to drive I/O down both paths.

You can also have multiple “orange pipes” (the iSCSI connections) in each “purple pipe” (single iSCSI session) - Multiple Connections per Session (which effectively multipaths below the MPIO stack), shown in the diagram below.


But in the ESX software iSCSI intiator case, you can only have one orange “pipe” for each purple pipe for every target (green boxes marked 2), and only one “purple pipe” for every iSCSI target. The end of the “purple pipe” is the iSCSI intiator port – and these are the “on ramps” for MPIO

So, no matter what MPIO setup you have in ESX, it doesn't matter how many paths show up in the storage multipathing GUI for multipathing to a single iSCSI Target, because there’s only one iSCSI initiator port, only one TCP port per iSCSI target. The alternate path to the gets established after the primary active path is unreachable. This is shown in the diagram below.


VMware can’t be accused of being unclear about this. Directly in the iSCSI SAN Configuration Guide: “ESX Server‐based iSCSI initiators establish only one connection to each target. This means storage systems with a single target containing multiple LUNs have all LUN traffic on that one connection”, but in general, in my experience, this is relatively unknown.

This usually means that customers find that for a single iSCSI target (and however many LUNs that may be behind that target – 1 or more), they can’t drive more than 120-160MBps.


This shouldn’t make anyone conclude that iSCSI is not a good choice or that 160MBps is a show-stopper. For perspective I was with a VERY big customer recently (more than 4000 VMs on Thursday and Friday two weeks ago) and their comment was that for their case (admittedly light I/O use from each VM) this was working well. Requirements differ for every customer.

Now, this behavior will be changing in the next major VMware release. Among other improvements, the iSCSI initiator will be able to use multiple iSCSI sessions (hence multiple TCP connections). Looking at our diagram, this corresponds with “multiple purple pipes”for a single target. It won’t support MC/S or “multiple orange pipes per each purple pipe” – but in general this is not a big deal (large scale use of MC/S has shown a marginal higher efficiency than MPIO at very high end 10GbE configurations) .

Multiple iSCSI sessions will mean multiple “on-ramps” for MPIO (and multiple “conversations” for Link Aggregation). The next version also brings core multipathing improvements in the vStorage initiative (improving all block storage): NMP round robin, ALUA support, and EMC PowerPath for VMware which integrates into the MPIO framework and further improves multipathing. In the spirit of this post, EMC is working to make PowerPath for VMware as heterogeneous as we can.

Together – multiple iSCSI sessions per iSCSI target and improved multipathing means aggregate throughput for a single iSCSI target above that 160MBps mark in the next VMware release, as people are playing with now. Obviously we’ll do a follow up post.

(Strongly) Recommended Additional Reading

I would STRONGLY recommend reading a series of posts that the inimitable Scott Lowe has done on ESX networking, and start at his recap here:

http://blog.scottlowe.org/2008/12/19/vmware-esx-networking-articles/

Also – I would strongly recommend reading the vendor documentation on this carefully.

  • START HERE - VMware: iSCSI SAN Configuration Guide
  • EMC Celerra: VMware ESX Server Using EMC Celerra Storage Systems – Solutions Guide
  • EMC CLARiiON: VMware ESX Server Using EMC CLARiiON Storage Systems - Solutions Guide
  • EMC DMX: VMware ESX Server Using EMC Symmetrix Storage Systems – Solutions Guide
  • NetApp: NetApp & VMware Virtual Infrastructure 3 : Storage Best Practices (Vaughn is proud to say this is the most popular NetApp TR)
  • HP/LeftHand: LeftHand Networks VI3 field guide for SAN/iQ 8 SANs
  • Dell/EqualLogic:
> Network Performance Guidelines
> VMware Virtual Infrastructure 3.x Considerations, Configuration and Operation Using an Equallogic PS Series SAN

ENOUGH WITH THE LEARNING!!! HOW do you get high iSCSI throughput in ESX 3.x?

As discussed earlier, the ESX 3.x software initiator really only works on a single TCP connection for each target – so all traffic to a single iSCSI Target will use a single logical interface. Without extra design measures, it does limit the amount of IO available to each iSCSI target to roughly 120 – 160 MBs of read and write access.

This design does not limit the total amount of I/O bandwidth available to an ESX host configured with multiple GbE links for iSCSI traffic (or more generally VMKernel traffic) connecting to multiple datastores across multiple iSCSI targets, but does for a single iSCSI target without taking extra steps.

Here are the questions that customers usually ask themselves:

Question 1: How do I configure MPIO (in this case, VMware NMP) and my iSCSI targets and LUNs to get the most optimal use of my network infrastructure? How do I scale that up?

Question 2: If I have a single LUN that needs really high bandwidth – more than 160MBps and I can’t wait for the next major ESX version, how do I do that?

Question 3: Do I use the Software Initiator or the Hardware Initiator?

Question 4: Do I use Link Aggregation and if so, how?

Here are the answers you seek…

.

.

.

Question 1: How do I configure MPIO (in this case, VMware NMP) and my iSCSI targets and LUNs to get the most optimal use of my network infrastructure? How do I scale that up?

Answer 1: Keep it simple. Use the ESX iSCSI software initiator. Use multiple iSCSI targets. Use MPIO at the ESX layer. Add Ethernet links and iSCSI targets to increase overall throughput. Ser your expectation for no more than ~160MBps for a single iSCSI target.

Remember an iSCSI session is from initiator to target. If use multiple iSCSI targets, with multiple IP addresses, you will use all the available links in aggregate, the storage traffic in total will load balance relatively well. But any individual one target will be limited to a maximum of single GbE connection's worth of bandwidth.

Remember that this also applies to all the LUNs behind that target. So, consider that as you distribute the LUNs appropriately among those targets.

The ESX initiator uses the same core method to get a list of targets from any iSCSI array (static configuration or dynamic discovery using the iSCSI SendTargets request) and then a list of LUNs behind that target (SCSI REPORT LUNS command).

So, to place your LUNs appropriately to balance the workload:

  • On an EMC CLARiiON, each physical interface is seen by an ESX host as a separate target, so balance the LUNs behind your multiple iSCSI targets (physical ports).
  • On a Dell/EqualLogic array, since every LUN is a target, balancing is automatic and you don’t have to do this.
  • On an HP/LeftHand array, since every LUN is a target, balancing is automatic and you don’t have to do this.
  • On a NetApp array each interface is a seen by an ESX host as a separate target, so balance your LUNs behind the targets.
  • On an EMC Celerra array, you can configure as many iSCSI targets as you want, up to 1000 and assign them to any virtual or physical network interface - balance your LUNs behind the targets.
Select your active paths in the VMware ESX multi-pathing dialog to balance the I/O across the paths to your targets and LUNs using the Virtual Center dialog shown below (from the VMWare iSCSI SAN Configuration Guide). Also it can take up to 60 seconds for the standby path to become active as the session needs to be established and the MPIO failover needs to occur, as noted in VMware iSCSI configuration guide. There are some good tips there (and in the Vendor best practice docs) about extending guest timeouts to withstand the delay without a fatal I/O error in the guest.



Question 2: If I have a single LUN that needs really high bandwidth – more than 160MBps and I can’t wait for the next major ESX version, how do I do that?

Answer 2: Use an iSCSI software initiator in the guest along with either MPIO or MC/S

This model allows the Guest Operating Systems to be “directly” on the SAN and to manage their own LUNs. Assign multiple vNICs to the VM, and map those to different pNICs. Many of the software initiators in this space are very robust (like the Microsoft iSCSI initiator). They provide their guest-based multipathing and load-balancing via MPIO (or MC/S) based on the number of NICs allocated to the VM.

As we worked on this post, all the vendors involved agreed – we’re surprised that this mechanism isn't more popular. People have been doing it for a long time, and it works, even through VMotion operations where some packets are lost (TCP retransmits them – iSCSI is ok with occasional loss, but constant losses slow TCP down – something to look at if you’re seeing poor iSCSI throughput).

It has a big downside, though – you need to manually configure the storage inside each guest, which doesn’t scale particularly well from a configuration standpoint – so for most customers they stick with the “keep it simple” method in Answer 1, and selectively use this for LUNs needing high throughput.

There are other bonuses too:

  • This also allows host SAN tools to operate seamlessly – on both physical or virtual environments – integration with databases, email systems, backup systems, etc.
  • Also has the ability to use a different vSwitch and physical network ports than VMkernel allowing for more iSCSI load distribution and separation of VM data traffic from VM boot traffic.
  • Dynamic and automated LUN (i.e. you don’t need to do something in Virtual Center for the guest to use the storage) surfacing to the VM itself (useful in certain database test/dev use cases)
  • You can use it for VMs that require a SCSI-3 device (think Windows 2008 cluster quorum disks – though those are not officially supported by VMware even as of VI3.5 update 3)

There are, of course, things that negative about this approach.

  • I suppose "philosophically" there's something a little dirty of "penetrating the virtualizing abstraction layer", and yeah - I get why that philosophy exists. But hey, we're not really philosophers, right? We're IT professionals, and this works well :-)
  • It is notable that this option means that SRM is not supported (which depends on LUNs presented to ESX, not to guests)
Question 3: Do I use the Software Initiator or the Hardware Initiator?

Answer 3: In general, use the Software Initiator except where iSCSI boot is specifically required.

This method bypasses the ESX software initiator entirely. Like the ESX software initiator, hardware iSCSI initiators uses the ESX MPIO storage stack for multipathing – but doesn’t have the single connection per target limit.

But, since you still have all the normal caveats with static load balancing and using the ESX NMP software (active/passive model, with static, manual loadbalancing), this won’t increase the throughput for a single iSCSI target.

In general, across all the contributors from each company, our personal preference is to use the software initiator. Why? In general it’s simple, and since it’s used very widely, very tested, very robust. It also has a clear 10GbE support path.

Question 4: Do I use Link Aggregation and if so, how?

Answer 4: There are some reasons to use Link Aggregation, but increasing a throughput to a single iSCSI target isn’t one of them in ESX 3.x.


What about Link Aggregation – shouldn’t that resolve the issue of not being able to drive more than a single GbE for each iSCSI target? In a word – NO. A TCP connection will have the same IP addresses and MAC addresses for the duration of the connection, and therefore the same hash result. This means that regardless of your link aggregation setup, in ESX 3.x, the network traffic from an ESX host for a single iSCSI target will always follow a single link.


So, why discuss it here? While this post focuses on iSCSI, in some cases, customers are using both NFS and iSCSI datastores. In the NFS datastore case, MPIO mechanisms are not an option, load-balancing and HA is all about Link Aggregation. So in that case, the iSCSI solution needs to work in with concurrently existing Link Aggregation.

Now, Link Aggregation can be used completely as an alternative to MPIO from the iSCSI initiator to the target. That said, it is notably more complex than the MPIO mechanism, requiring more configuration, and isn’t better in any material way.

If you’ve configured Link Aggregation to support NFS datastores, it’s easier to leave the existing Link Aggregation from the ESX host to the switch, and then simply layer on top many iSCSI targets and MPIO (i.e. “just do answer 1 on top of the Link Aggregation”).

To keep this post concise and focused on iSCSI, the multi-vendor team here decided to cut out some of NFS/iSCSI hybrid use case and configuration details, and leave that to a subsequent EMC Celerra/NetApp FAS post.


In closing.....

I would suggest that anyone considering iSCSI with VMware should feel confident that their deployments can provide high performance and high availability. You would be joining many, many customer enjoying the benefits of VMware and advanced storage that leverages Ethernet.

To make your deployment a success, understand the “one link max per iSCSI target” ESX 3.x iSCSI initiator behavior. Set your expectations accordingly, and if you have to, use the guest iSCSI initiator method for LUNs needing higher bandwidth than a single link can provide.

Most of all ensure that you follow the best practices of your storage vendor and VMware.

Posted at 09:00 AM in EMC Competitors, EMC VMware Tech Stuff, iSCSI | Permalink
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---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "A “Multivendor Post” to help our mutual iSCSI customers using VMware"

Tuesday, June 23, 2009

Hack website using BlackWidow

Every budding Internet hacker or a user wants to hack a website,but is unsure on how to do that.In my last post,I Hack website using BlackWidow discussed about Google Hacks which can be used to search for vulnerable sites and content from Google,however if you want to scan a website for its loopholes,you will need a good website ripper or a mapping tool. BlackWidow fills the missing link here.BlackWidow is a website scanner,a site ripper and mapping tool which is primarily used to scan a site and create a complete profile of the site’s structure, files, external links and even link errors.Upon scanning BlackWidow will download all file types such as pictures and images, audio and MP3 and literally any type of files from any websites.And If you are good (:P) then you can write your own "Plugins" for impossible to scan sites.

Primary features of black widow are -

  • It can even scan and retrieve hidden emails

Get hidden emails from the sites

  • Can reproduce the whole website directory structure.

BlackWidow can scan and reproduce the directory structure of a website easily

  • BlackWidow can scan a site without downloading it to your hard drive

It can scan a site without downloading it to your hard drive

  • Monitors web activity and keeps an eye on every program which access internet.

BlackWidow actively monitors who or what access the net

  • BlackWidow can be customized in any which way you like by using Plugins which can be written with little or very less programming experience.

BlackWidow has lots of plugins:)

That said,I was easily able to download the directory structure of my college’s website and scan it using Acunetix Vulnerability scanner for some loopholes and exploits.And it was easy as hell !! Overall,its a must have tool for security experts and noobs alike.

You can download it from the link below,its a trial version.

Download Black Widow

 

[PS:You know how to get full versions..aint it? and if not,email me,I will give you the link..afterall,Knowledge is unbounded and free]

 

Cheers and Keep Learning

 

POSTED BY XERO.ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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Monday, June 22, 2009

Hack Google with Google Hacks

I earlier blogged about some cool google dorks to search around,but it required precision and a bit of memorising capability (which I suppose we all are lacking nowdays :P). Here comes the rescue tool for the lazy - Google Hacks is a compilation of carefully crafted Google searches that expose novel functionality from Google's search Hack Google queries using Google Hacks and map services. You can use it to view a timeline of your search results, view a map, search for music, search for books, and perform many other specific kinds of searches. You can also use this program to use Google as a proxy.As the website itself says,Google Hacks is A compact utility for several google hacks. Although its not good as the Gooscan-a far superior tool to scan for vulnerabilities in web,its well worth a try.
Google Hacks in Action
The Automated search results
Google Hacks is well worth a shot,however I will be posting about better tools.You can download Google Hacks from the link given below
Download Google Hacks

Cheers and  Keep learning

POSTED BY XERO.ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
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Sunday, June 21, 2009

MGS Goes PSN

Konami has launched the original Metal Gear Solid on PSN for $9.99.What Hideo Kojima created became a groundbreaking Yeah..MGS on PSN :) classic digital masterpiece by skillfully combining cinematic, fully voiced cut scenes with groundbreaking realitime 3D gameplay to deliver an all-new kind of genre that became known as tactical-espionage action. Plus, it was simply bad-ass.

The first remake,Twin Snakes was ruined. It was still a good game, but no where near as good as the original. The voice acting was all re-done and none of the actors put in as much effort, a lot of the classic lines have no impact in that version, and many of the scenes have Snake performing Spider-man style flips and jumps which appear very out of place and just silly.Some old Snake Action..I really love that

Seriously, if you’ve never played this game, you gotta download this bad boy and check it out. One of the greatest games of all time. Period.Its simply deserves your time,I have played it for more than 10 times and I am still going strong for it,its that good,and no I am not a delirious fanboy of this game :P its just that good.

Play or D!* :P

 

[PS:Sorry for a late update,i was out of station :) ]

 

POSTED BY XERO.ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.SOURCE- GT AND EPICBATTLE.

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Friday, June 19, 2009

Sniffers - Summary

Summary
  • A sniffer is a piece of software that captures the traffic flowing into and out of a computer attached to a network.

  • A sniffer attack is commonly used to grab logins and passwords that are traveling around on the network.

  • Sniffing can be active or passive.

  • Popular attack methods include man in the middle attack and session hijacking

  • On switched networks, MAC flooding and ARP spoofing is carried out.


---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "Sniffers - Summary"

DNS Sniffing and Spoofing

DNS Sniffing and Spoofing
  • DNS Spoofing is said to have occurred when a DNS entry points to another IP instead of the legitimate IP address.

  • When an attacker wants to poison a DNS cache, he will use a faulty DNS - which can be his own domain running a hacked DNS server. The DNS server is termed as hacked because the IP address records are manipulated to suit the attacker's needs.

Concept

DNS Spoofing is said to have occurred when a DNS entry points to another IP instead of the legitimate IP address. Let us see how this is done.

Typically, a DNS Server contains the records only for the machines of the domain it has authority over. If it has to answer queries about machines outside its domain, it has to send a request to the other DNS Server which handles these machines. As frequent communication is not practical, the DNS server keeps a cache and stores in it all the replies returned by other DNS servers.

When an attacker wants to poison a DNS cache, he will use a faulty DNS - which can be his own domain running a hacked DNS server. The DNS server is termed as hacked because the IP address records are manipulated to suit the attacker's needs.

Attack Methods

The attack methodology goes like this. The attacker sends a request to the target DNS Server asking it to resolve www.attacker.com (attacker's domain). As the target DNS does not have the pointing record in its cache, it seeks the answer from the responsible name server (which is the attacker's DNS server). While replying to the target DNS server, the hacked DNS server transfers all the records, including the manipulated records, to the target server. This process is called zone transfer. The DNS server is poisoned as long as the cache is not cleared or updated. This way, the attacker can make some records point to spoofed addresses or even remain silent and let all the traffic pass through his server.

Countermeasures

Countermeasures include implementing much of the anti-spoofing rules on the border routers of network. This can be as simple as not allowing anything out with a source IP address not belonging to the network or anything in with a source IP address belonging to the network.

The next level of protection can reside on the access routers. This could also be used in order to prevent IP spoofing at its most common source. While these filters can be sometimes tricky when it comes to combining dynamic IP and 'multi-POP' static IP routing, if implemented well, these filters can completely prevent IP spoofing that originates from an access network.

WinDNSSpoof
  • This tool is a simple DNS ID Spoofer for Windows 9x/2K.

  • In order to use it you must be able to sniff traffic of the computer being attacked.

  • Usage: wds -h

    Example: wds -n www.microsoft.com -i 216.239.39.101 -9 00-00-39-5c-45-3b

This is a simple tool for spoofing the DNS ID for Windows 9x/2K. In order to use the user must be able to sniff traffic of the computer being attacked. However, it does not work in a switched network, as a switched network requires ARP Cache Poisoning tools like winarp_sk or winarp_mim.

A personal firewall must be configured to block UDP 53 destination port to check outgoing DNS traffic in order to ensure that the DNS Server does not answer before WinDNSSpoof does. The working of WinDNSSpoof then takes care of spoofing only those packets that are required to - while the rest are allow to go through. This is made possible by specifying the MAC address of the DNS server or the default gateway in case the DNS server is in another network.

Usage: wds -h

Example: wds -n www.targetsite.com -i 216.239.39.101 -g 00-00-39-5c-45-3b

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "DNS Sniffing and Spoofing"

Sniffers - Tool and Softwares: Network Sniffers

SMAC is a Windows MAC Address Modifying Utility that allows users to change MAC address for most Network Interface Cards (NIC) on the Windows 2000, XP, and 2003 Server systems. This is irrespective of whether the manufactures of the cards permit the change. It must be noted that SMAC does not burn a new address on the hardware and the new MAC addresses the user change will sustain from reboots..

SMAC has 2 modes of operation: [WBEM ON] and [WBEM OFF]. If the "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI)" service is running, it will be running on [WBEM ON] mode. Otherwise, it is on [WBEM OFF] mode. The [WBEM ON] mode shows more information. The tool also allows the user to log and track SMAC activities.

SMAC takes advantage of the NdisReadNetworkAddress function in the Microsoft Device Driver Development Kit (DDK.) NdisReadNetworkAddress(...) is called by the network adapter driver to obtain a user specified MAC address in the registry. After the driver confirms that there is a valid MAC address specified in the registry key, the driver then programs the MAC address to its hardware registers to override the burnt-in MAC address.

SMAC was designed originally as a security vulnerability testing tool for MAC address authorization and authentication systems, Intrusion Detection Systems and MAC address based software licenses testing tool. When changing MAC address, the user must ensure that they assign MAC addresses according to IANA Number Assignments database.

Mac Changer
  • MAC changer is a Linux utility for setting a specific MAC address for a network interface.

  • It enables the user to set the MAC address randomly. It allows specifying the MAC of another vendor or setting another MAC of the same vendor.

  • The user can also set a MAC of the same kind (e.g.: wireless card).

  • It offers a choice of vendor MAC list (more than 6200 items) to choose from

MAC changer is a Linux utility for setting a specific MAC address for a network interface. It enables the user to set the MAC address randomly. It allows specifying the MAC of another vendor or setting another MAC of the same vendor. The user can also set a MAC of the same kind (e.g.: wireless card). It offers a choice of vendor MAC list (more than 6200 items) to choose from. The latest version is 1.3 and it offers more than 35 wireless cards as well.

Usage Examples:

# macchanger eth1

Current MAC: 00:40:96:43:ef:9c [wireless] (Cisco/Aironet 4800/340)

Faked MAC: 00:40:96:43:ef:9d [wireless] (Cisco/Aironet 4800/340)

# macchanger -A eth1

Current MAC: 00:40:96:43:39:a6 [wireless] (Cisco/Aironet 4800/340)

Faked MAC: 00:10:5a:1e:06:93 (3Com, Fast Etherlink XL in a Gateway 2000)


Iris is an advanced data and network traffic analyzer, a "sniffer", that collects, stores, organizes and reports all data traffic on the network. Iris has advanced integrated technology that allows it to reconstruct network traffic, all with a push of a button.

Iris can reconstruct raw data in packets and turn it into complete HTTP, SMTP and POP3 sessions in their original format. The user can view both outgoing and incoming email messages, web browsing sessions, instant messenger exchanges, non-encrypted web-based email and FTP transfers. Using this, the user can set up automated screens to monitor the Web-browsing patterns of the network. With Iris, the user is able to read the actual text of an email - as well as any attachments - exactly as it was sent. Iris will reconstruct the actual html pages that network users have visited and even simulate cookies for entry into password-protected websites.

Iris provides a larger variety of statistical measurements such as pie charts and bar graphs, and provides information on protocol distribution, top hosts, packet-size distribution and bandwidth usage. Iris' Packet Editor gives the ability to create custom or spoof packets and to send them across the Internet, to specific ports or addresses, or repeatedly across the network. Iris has a fast packet injector that handles up to 9000 packets per second.

Iris can be easily configured to only capture specific data through any combination of packet filters. Packet filters can be based on the hardware or protocol layer, any number of key words, MAC or IP address, source and destination port, custom data and size of the packets


NetIntercept from Sandstorm enterprises belongs to the category of Network Forensics Analysis Tools (NFAT) that is gaining popularity these days. Using a network forensics tool a user can spy on people's email, learn passwords, determine Web pages viewed, and even spy on the contents of a person's shopping cart. The tremendous power these forensic tools have over today's networks makes them subject to abuse. The difference is in range or depth of network monitoring. These tools can be used for full content network monitoring - not just filters.

NetIntercept 1.2 captures LAN traffic using a standard Ethernet interface card placed in promiscuous mode and a modified UNIX kernel. The capture subsystem runs continuously, whether or not the GUI is active. NetIntercept performs stream reconstruction on demand. When the user selects a range of captured network traffic to analyze, NetIntercept assembles those packets into network connection data streams. The reconstructed streams are then presented to the NetIntercept analysis subsystem for identification and analysis. Once TCP streams are reconstructed and parsed, some of the objects that they contain need to be stored for long periods of time. Examples of such objects are web pages, files transferred by FTP, and e-mail attachments.

Besides controlling data capture and analysis, the GUI offers sophisticated search criteria. A user can find one or many network connections according to the time of day, source or destination hardware or Internet address, source or destination TCP or UDP port name or number, username associated with the connection, electronic mail sender, recipient(s) or subject header, file name or World Wide Web URI associated with the transfer, specific protocols or content types recognized in the connection's contents. Once a connection has been identified, the user can drill down to view the search criteria extracted from it

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "Sniffers - Tool and Softwares: Network Sniffers"

Macof, MailSnarf, URLSnarf, WebSpy

Macof floods the local network with random MAC addresses, causing some switches to fail open in repeating mode, and thereby facilitates sniffing.

Mailsnarf is capable of capturing and outputting SMTP mail traffic that is sniffed on the network
urlsnarf is a neat tool for monitoring Web traffic.
Webspy allows the user to see all the WebPages visited by the victim.
Each of the tools included in the dsniff distribution has some unique function. In general, the tools dsniff, filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, urlsnarf, and webspy are used to passively monitor a vulnerable shared network. By overloading the switch, a hacker could have access to all the data passing through the switch.

Tools
One tool for doing this is called "macof. Dsniffs "macof" generates random MAC addresses exhausting the switch's memory. It is capable of generating 155,000 MAC entries on a switch per minute. Some switches than revert to acting like a hub.
The whole process of sniffing another's mail becomes an easy task with mailsnarf. Once the attacker has access to the target subnet, he can use mailsnarf to capture mail traffic that passes through the network subnet or Ethernet switch.

Tools
Mailsnarf makes it possible to save the messages in standard mail format, so that the attacker can use just about any e-mail client to read what is captured as easily as he can read mail from his inbox. Mailsnarf reassembles and displays e-mail traffic in a legible manner, thus enabling the attacker to read other users' e-mail in real time.
Tools
urlsnarf is a tool for monitoring Web traffic. urlsnarf grabs all the HTTP requests from the captured network traffic and outputs the results in the Common Log Format (CLF), as used by Web servers such as Apache or IIS.
The only drawback of urlsnarf is that at present, it is hard coded to monitor TCP ports 80 (clear-text HTTP), 3128 (MS-proxy), and 8080 (generic/squid proxy). HTTP traffic going to other TCP ports is ignored. Because urlsnarf generates output as CLF log lines, the output can be piped to any log analysis program that uses CLF Web server logs.

Tools
The webspy package (webspy.exe) is a hacking tool. By the usage webspy 111.111.111.111 the program intercepts all HTTP traffic to and from the IP addresses 111.111.111.111 and passes it off to a local browser. This will open Netscape or IE and the traffic sent to the attacker's browser will match that of the target. He can then follow targets around as they surf the net. However, Webspy won't follow targets over ssl connection or reveal information entered into form fields (like passwords).
read more "Macof, MailSnarf, URLSnarf, WebSpy"

Man in the Middle Attack

Attack Methods

How does an attacker exploit this vulnerability using a tool such as dsniff? The attacker will use webmitm and sshmitm tools from the dsniff package for attacking HTTPS or SSH.

Attackers position themselves between two systems and actively participate in the connection to gather data. The attacker may also run the dnsspoof program configured to send false DNS information so that a DNS query for a given website will resolve to the attacker's IP address. Then the attacker will activate webmitm program such that it will transparently proxy all HTTP and HTTPS traffic it receives.

The DNS spoof program detects DNS request for www.website.com and redirects the client to attacker's machine. The ARP table convinces the victim's machine that it is indeed talking to the intended web server. The victim's browser starts to establish a secure connection.

All messages for establishing SSL connection are sent to webmitm running on the attacker's machine. webmitm acts as a SSL proxy, establishing two SSL connections - one from victim to the attacker's machine and the other from attacker's machine to the actual web server. When establishing the SSL session between the victim machine and the attacker machine, webmitm will send the attacker's own certificate.

The victim's browser will notice that the certificate is not signed by a trusted Certificate Authority and show a message to the user asking the user whether to accept this un-trusted certificate or not. The normal tendency is to accept it, thinking it is some error message.

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "Man in the Middle Attack"

bX-572dn8 Blog Posting Error

Hi friends, today while posting I have seen an error. Screen shot attached below. I click back and repost it and its done. Can any one tell me pls... why this error occurs ??




---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
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ARP Spoofing & Sniffing HTTPS and SSH


A possible way to sniff information would be to control an ARP table of a computer. ARP spoofing involves changing the MAC to IP address entries, causing traffic to be redirected from the legitimate system to an unauthorized system of the attacker's choice.

This is achieved by sending out a forged ARP packet to the target system, telling it that its default gateway has changed to the attacker's system. This way, whenever the target system sends traffic on the network, it will send it to the attacker's system first, which then forwards the packet on to its original destination as if nothing ever happened.

Attack Methods

Let us take a closer look at the attack methodology. There are switches that are not foiled by MAC flooding. These switches stop storing new MAC addresses once their memory reaches a given limit. In this scenario, an attacker can use DSniff's tool called arpspoof. arpspoof allows an attacker to manipulate ARP traffic on a LAN by redefining the ARP table.

Usually, such attempts are preceded by the scanning and enumeration phases where the attacker draws up a map of the network and discovers the network topology. Looking at the network topology the attacker can decipher the IP address of the default router for the LAN. He then sets up the attack by configuring the IP layer of the attacker's machine to forward any packet it receives from the LAN to the IP address of the default router (IP forwarding). The next step in the attack is sending the fake ARP replies to the victim's machine.

This ARP changes the victims ARP table by remapping the default router's IP (layer 3) to attacker own MAC address (layer2). The victim machine sends the data, forwarding it to what it thinks is the default router (but unknowingly using the attackers MAC address).

The attacker sniffs the information using any kind of sniffing tool. The attacker's machine will promptly forward the victim's traffic to default router on the LAN. Upon reaching the default router the traffic is transmitted to the outside world. The attacker is now sniffing in a switched environment.


Sniffing HTTPS and SSH
  • SSL connection uses a session key to encrypt all data sent by server and client.

  • SSH is based on the public key encryption idea.

  • With SSH a session key is transmitted in an encrypted fashion using a public key stored on the server.

  • As such, these protocols - SSL and SSH are sound from a security standpoint. The problem however lies in the basis of these protocols - namely trust certificates and public keys.

One of the precautionary measures advocated to check information leakage by sniffing, is to use a secure protocol. While the S's in HTTPS, SSL and SSH stands for secure, the underlying basis of this is a trust relationship between public keys.

When an HTTPS connection is established, the server sends a certificate which the browser verifies. This certificate is like a digital driver's license identifying the Web server - that, it is indeed who it claims to be. This is endorsed by a certification authority by placing its digital signature on the certificate.

The browser on its part verifies the signature on the certificate to ensure that it is authentic and to verify server's identity. If the certificate was signed by a trusted Certificate Authority, an SSL connection will be established. Now, an SSL connection uses a session key to encrypt all data sent by server and client.

On the other hand, SSH does not support digital certificates though it is based on the public key cryptography. With SSH, a session key is transmitted in an encrypted fashion using a public key stored on the server. As such, these protocols SSL and SSH are sound from a security standpoint. The problem however lies in the basis of these protocols, namely trust certificates and public keys.

For SSL, if a web server sends the browser a certificate and if the browser does not recognize the certificate, it will prompt the user for his consent/approval to accept the certificate. For SSH the user will be warned that server's public key has changed. Nevertheless, he will still be permitted to establish connection to the server, thereby exposing him to attacks. Let us see how dsniff can be used by crackers to exploit this aspect.

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "ARP Spoofing & Sniffing HTTPS and SSH"

Active Sniffing and Passive Sniffing

Passive Sniffing

A packet sniffer is seldom the only tool used for an attack. This is because a sniffer can work only in a common collision domain. A common collision domain is a network segment that is not switched or bridged (i.e. connected through a hub). Any traffic that is not switched or bridged on a network segment can be seen by all machines on that segment. As sniffers gather packets at Data Link Layer it can potentially grab all the packets on the LAN of the machine running the Sniffer program.

This is because on a network with a hub implements a broadcast medium shared by all systems on the LAN. Any data sent across the LAN is actually sent to each and every machine connected to the LAN. If an attacker runs a Sniffer on one system on LAN, he can gather data sent to and from any other system on the LAN. Majority of the Sniffer tools are ideally suited to sniff data in a hub environment. These tools are called passive sniffers as they passively wait for the data to be sent and capture them. They are efficient in silently gathering the data from the LAN.

Note

In passive sniff ing, the intruder gets access to the network by any of the following methods.

  • By compromising the physical security. An example of this can be the intruder walking into the building with his laptop and capturing data by plugging in to access the network.

  • Using a Trojan horse. Many Trojans have sniffing capability built into them. For instance, the Back Orifice server has a plugin known as "Butt Trumpet". Butt Trumpet will send the attacker an email when the server has been installed. Once the attacker knows that the victim's machine has been compromised, the attacker can then install a packet sniffer and use it.

Active Sniffing


One countermeasure against passive sniffing is to replace the network hub with a switch. Unlike a hub based network, switched ethernet does not broadcast all information to all systems on the LAN. The switch regulates the flow of data between its ports by actively monitoring the MAC address on each port, which helps it pass data only to its intended target.

In other words, the main difference between a switch and hub is that while a hub has no mapping, and thus broadcasts line data to every port on the device, a switch looks at the MAC address associated with each frame passing through it and sends the data to the required connection on the switch.

The switch thereby limits the data that a passive sniffer can gather. If there is a passive sniffer activated on a switched LAN, the sniffer will only be able to see data going to and from one machine - i.e. the system on which it is installed.

However, it must be noted that the development of switched networks was driven by the need for more bandwidth, and not for the need of more secure networks. Since the evolution was not driven by security needs, there are ways to circumvent this network posture and sniff the traffic.

So how does an attacker sniff on a switched LAN? The sniffers for a switched LAN actively inject traffic into the LAN to enable sniffing of the traffic. Hence the term 'active sniffing'. Some of the methods used in the attack include ARP Spoofing, MAC Flooding and MAC Duplicating etc.

EtherFlood
  • EtherFlood floods a switched network with Ethernet frames with random hardware addresses.

  • The effect on some switches is that they start sending all traffic out on all ports so that the attacker is able to sniff all traffic on the network.

In a switched network, the ARP table ensures that IP addresses are mapped to MAC addresses . However, this does not stop sniffing, as we see in ARP Spoofing. One way to sniff in a switched network is to convert the functionality of a switch to that of a hub.

In other words, to make a switch change its default directed output to broadcast method . One way of accomplishing this is to foil the switch by flooding the network with too many frames. When this happens, some switches become unable to perform the IP to MAC mappings and then "fail out" to broadcasting.

Tools

EtherFlood floods a switched network with Ethernet frames with random hardware addresses. The effect on some switches is that they start sending all traffic out on all ports so that sniffing of the switched network traffic is possible.


dsniff
  • dsniff is a collection of tools for network auditing and penetration testing.

  • dsniff, filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, urlsnarf, and webspy passively monitor a network for interesting data (passwords, e-mail, files, etc.).

  • arpspoof, dnsspoof, and macof facilitate the interception of network traffic normally unavailable to an attacker (e.g, due to layer-2 switching).

  • sshmitm and webmitm implement active monkey-in-the-middle attacks against redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions by exploiting weak bindings in ad-hoc PKI.

dsniff is a collection of tools for network auditing and penetration testing. dsniff, filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, urlsnarf, and webspy passively monitor a network for interesting data (passwords, e-mail, files, etc.).

Written by Dug Song, this collection of tools (bundled with the main dsniff utility) has certain unique functionality. However, they can be categorized as having similar baseline functionality. In general, the tools dsniff, filesnarf, mailsnarf, msgsnarf, urlsnarf, and webspy can be used to sniff on a compromised host behind a firewall and look for interesting content.

These tools can be put to good use by network administrators or be used to obtain sensitive information such as login information that is sent in the clear or is weakly encrypted. These tools can also auto detect various messaging protocols (about 30 are included) when dsniff is launched with the "-m" option.

urlsnarf is capable of intercepting all http requests from the network it is deployed on, and formatting them into the Common Log Format (CLF) used by MS IIS and Apache. This makes it possible to conduct a log analysis by using suitable programs to interpret the results obtained from urlsnarf. urlsnarf is hard-coded to listen on ports 80 (where clear text http resides) as well as port 3128 (MS-proxy) and 8080 (generic proxy).

arpspoof, dnsspoof, and macof work on the interception of switched network traffic that is usually unavailable to a sniffer program due to the segment switching that occurs at the ISO layer 2 level. sshmitm and webmitm implement active man-in-the-middle attacks against redirected SSH and HTTPS sessions by exploiting weak bindings in ad-hoc PKI.

---Regards,
Amarjit Singh
read more "Active Sniffing and Passive Sniffing"